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BAR BRIEFS
RECENT CASES
CONFLICTS OF LAW-CONTRACTS-LAW OF STATE IN WHICH
CONTRACT IS TO BE PERFORMED GOVERNS PERFORMANCE OF CON-
TRACT*-Bonholders under the Superior and Duluth Division and
Terminal First Mortgage claimed interest on their bonds at a rate
greater than four per cent after May 1, 1936, the maturity date
of the bonds. The bond mortgage was executed and delivered in
New York, and the interest thereon was payable in that state.
There was no express provision in the mortgage as to the interest
rate after maturity. In New York, the statutory interest rate of
six per cent governed after maturity unless the parties stipulated
for a different rate. Other bondholders of the corporation con-
tended that either the mortgage should be construed to imply the
same rate of interest as applied before maturity, or that Minne-
sota law, the law of the forum, governed the contract. The court
held, that an order be granted allowing interest to claimants at the
New York statutory rate. As no interest rate could be inferred
from the mortgage, the New York statutory rate should be applied
to the bonds after maturity, since the law of the state in which a
contract is to be performed governs the performance of a contract.
In Re Wisconsin Central Ry. Co., (D. Minn. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 151.
(Facts and holdings on other issues involved in the case are omit-
tel.)
The instant case followed the decision of McCulloch v. Cana-
dian Pacific Ry Co., (D. Minn. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 534, in holding
first, that the conflict of laws rules of Minnesota must be followed
by a federal court sitting in this state under the decision of Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Electric Mfg. Co., (1941) 313 U. S. 487, 61 S. Ct.
1020, 85 L. Ed. 1477; and, secondly, that the conflict of laws rule
in Minnesota is that the law of the place of performance governs
the performance of a contract. The court in the McCulloch Case
cited Thomson-Houston Electric Co. v. Palmer, (1893) 52 Minn.
174, 53 N. W. 1137, 38 Am. St. Rep. 536, as authority in support
of the latter proposition; but in that case, because the contract
was both made and performed in Illinois, it was stated that the
parties would presumably intend the law of Illinois to apply.
While the Restatement, Conflict of Laws, sec. 358, p. 437, adheres
to the rule stated by the court in the instant case, the law on the
proposition in Minnesota, which the court purported to follow, is
not clear. McClintock, Conflict of Laws as to Contract: The Re-
statement and Minnesota Decisions Compared, (1929) 13 Minne-
sota Law Review 538, 551-552. Although the question has never
been squarely presented to the Supreme Court of Minnesota, there
are dicta in accord with the rule of the Restatement. See Lewis
v. Bush, (1883) 30 Minn. 244, 247, 15 N. W. 113; Johnson v. Nel-
son (1915) 128 Minn. 158, 160-161, 150 N. W. 620; but see Gilbert
v. Fosston Manufacturing Co., (1927) 174 Minn. 68, 71, 216 N. W.
778, mod., 174 Minn. 68, 218 N. W. 451. In general, it may be
said that the Minnesota court has found it unnecessary to dis-
tinguish between cases involving the question of validity of a
contract in its inception, (1936) 20 Minnesota Law Review 309,
(1940) 24 Minnesota Law Review 410, and cases concerning the
*This case note first appeared in Volume 30 of the Minnesota Law Review at
page 123, and we are indebted to that publication for permission to reprint it.
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law of performance of a valid contract. McClintock, Conflict of
Laws as to Contracts: Minnesota Decisions, (1926) 10 Minnesota
Law Review 498, 499. The decision in the instant case is un-
questionably correct, since the contract was both made and per-
formed in New York, True v. Northern Pacific Ry Co., (1914) 126
Minn. 72, 75-76, 147 N. W. 948; Patterson v. Wyman, (1919) 142
Minn. 70, 72, 170 N. W. 928, but quaere as to what rule the Su-
preme Court of Minnesota would follow if a valid contract were
made in Minnesota to be performed in another state.
CONSTITUTIONAL . LAW-STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE
COMMERCE*-The city of Richmond by ordinance required all soli-
citors to pay an annual tax before being permitted to solicit busi-
ness within the city.' Appellant, a representative of a Washington,
D. C. firm, was arrested for soliciting without having previously
procured the required license.2 Appellant was convicted and her
conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia.3 On appeal to the United States Supreme Court she
contended that the statute upon which her conviction was based
was unconstitutional, inasmuch as it was repugnant to the Com-
merce Clause of the Federal Constitution. 4 Held, reversed. Taxes
that discriminate against interstate commerce are unconstitu-
tional and the court in each case will look at the practical conse-
quences of such taxes to see if such discrimination is present. 5
Nippert v. City of Richmond, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. 586.
Until 1938, while the Court was dominated by the belief that
interstate commerce should be free from all state taxation, taxes
similar in design to the impost sought to be imposed in the princi-
pal case were consistently invalidated.6 Then in Western Live
;This case note first appeared in Volume 44 of the Michingan Law Review at
page 1135, and we are indented to that publication ior permission to reprint it.
1 Richmond City Code (1939) c. 10, § 23. The ordinance lays an annual license
tax in the following terms: "(Upon) . . .- Agents-Solicitors-Persons, Firms or Cor-
porations engaged in business as solicitors . . . $50.00 and one-half of one percentum
of the gross earnings, receipts, fees or commissions for the preceding license year in
excess of $1,000.00 . . ." Quoted by the Court, principal case at 587.
2 The firm in question employs solicitors throughout the country selling ladies'
garments at $2.98 each. The solicitor obtains the order and receives a down pay-
ment usually sufficient to pay the solicitor's commission. The order is then sent to
the home office and is filled through the mails. The record does not show whether
appellant would have been compensated by her company had she paid the tax. Yet
whether the company does or does iot absorb the tax should not affect the result.
3 183 Va. 689, 33 S. E. (2d) 206 (1945).
4 Article 1, Sec. 8 ,cl. 3, "Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce
. . . among the several States . . ."
5 The statute also required that in applying for the permit, "evidence of the
good character of the individual, the members of the firm, or the chief officers of
the corporation, as the case may be" had to be produced. The Director of Public
Safety was to make a reasonable investigation and if he was satisfied that the appli-
cant was of a good moral character and fit to engage in the proposed business he
was to issue the permit.
The appellant, before the United States Supreme Court, argued that this dis-
cretionary power given to the director was sufficient to invalidate the measure with-
out respect to the character of the tax. This contention had not been relied upon
in the lower court and the court did not consider this question. It does seem, how-
ever, that if the power given to the director can be shown to be a reasonable safety
measure it would not be open to attack.
6 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592 (1887),
was the first case involving such a tax to come before the Court. There the Court
flatly said at p. 497, "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at all, even though the
same amount of tax should be laid on domestic commerce . . ." Since then, and
until 1938, nineteen such taxes have been invalidated, culminating with Real Silk
Hosiery Mills v. Portland, 268 U. S. 325, 45 S. Ct. 529 (1925). For specific references
to these cases and an analysis of them in respect to their possible effect upon a
sales tax of the type considered in the Berwind-White case, see Lockhart. "The Sales
Tax in Interstate Commerce," 52 Harv. L. Rev. 617 (1939). For bibliographical material
on this subject generally see 43 Mich. L. Rev. 761 at 774-775, items 47-51 (1945).
